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Abstract
In this paper we study theoretically and empirically the role of the interaction
between skilled migration and intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection in deter-
mining innovation in developing countries (South). We show that although emigration
from the South may directly result in the well-known concept of brain drain, it also
causes a brain gain eﬀect, the extent of which depends on the level of IPRs protection
in the sending country. We argue this to come from a diaspora channel through which
the knowledge acquired by emigrants abroad can flow back to the South and enhance
the skills of the remaining workers there. By increasing the size of the innovation sector
and the skill-intensity of emigration, IPRs protection makes it more likely for diaspora
gains to dominate, thus facilitating a potential net brain gain. Our main theoretical
insights are then tested empirically using a panel dataset of emerging and developing
countries. The findings reveal a positive correlation between emigration and innovation
in the presence of strong IPRs protection.
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1 Introduction
International trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have often been identified as the
main determinants of innovation and growth in developing countries (South) (Saggi, 2002;
Keller, 2004). While the significance of trade and FDI has been confirmed by a two- and
three-fold increase in their ratio with respect to world output during the 1990s, high-skill
migration to developed countries (North) has witnessed an even faster increase (Docquier
and Rapoport, 2010). The resulting surge in the outward transfer of the human capital
embedded in migrants has created controversial debates about the threats and opportunities
that skilled emigration may pose to the South. On the one hand, the traditional literature
on migration and brain drain presents mechanisms through which skilled emigration could
be detrimental to growth.1 On the other hand, a growing branch of contributions argues
that skilled emigration need not harm the South and may even increase the potential for
development.
The so-called brain gain eﬀect derives from an incentive channel that works through the
increased expected returns to education brought about by migration prospects (Mountford,
1997; Stark et al. 2007; Beine et al., 2001, 2008).2 An additional channel is return migra-
tion, which can induce innovation through the knowledge embodied in migrants returning
from more advanced economies (Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003; Mayr and
Peri, 2009; Dustmann et al. 2011). Finally, cross-border diaspora networks among skilled
emigrants and natives may also promote access to foreign-produced-knowledge and foster
innovation by encouraging trade, investments and the recirculation of information back into
the sending countries (Agrawal et al., 2011; Kerr, 2008).3 Research in other disciplines such
as Meyer (2001) suggests such informal networks to be crucial in turning brain drain into
a net brain gain. Despite a large number of studies on diaspora networks, however, little
formal research in the economic literature directly examines the potential link between the
knowledge absorbed by emigrants abroad and innovation in their home countries.4
1Seminal works are those of Berry and Soligo (1969), Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) and Miyagiwa (1991).
For a recent complete survey of the literature on brain drain and development, see Docquier and Rapoport
(2010).
2The possibilities of such gains from emigration were first referred to by Bhagwati and Rodrigues (1975).
3 Student/scholarly networks, local associations of skilled expatriates, short-term consultancies by high-
skilled expatriots in their country of origins, and other not established intellectual/scientific diaspora net-
works are a few examples of such networks (Meyer and Brown, 1999).
4Williams (2007) and Oettl and Agrawal (2008) focus on the externalities of international migration to
emphasize their role in knowledge and technology transfer. More recently, Beine et al. (2011) show the
influence of diasporas on the evolution of migration flows and their composition in terms of skills.
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What are the consequences of skilled emigration for innovation in developing countries?
Do diaspora networks play a role in this process? Referring to Agrawal et al. (2011), the
Economist writes: "[...] having many scientists leave India does harm innovation there.
But Indian researchers also refer to [work by] scientists of Indian origin in America more
than very similar work by scientists with whom they do not share ethnic ties. So a scientific
diaspora gives countries of origin a leg-up in terms of access to the latest research, mitigating
some of the problems of a ’brain drain’. And given that the same scientist is going to be
more productive in America than in a developing country because of better facilities and
more resources, immigration may help overall innovation (some of the benefits of which may
flow back to firms in poorer countries)".5
In this paper we explore how emigration from the South aﬀects innovation activities
in the home (sending) country. In particular, we investigate the existence of a channel
through which the knowledge learned by emigrants after interacting with higher skills in the
North can flow back to the South.6 We refer to this channel as "intellectual diaspora", that
is, the remote mobilization of intellectuals and professionals abroad and their connection
to scientific, technological and cultural programs at home. We also examine the role of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection in the South by exploring how IPRs interact
with emigration in determining innovation performance. The key question we aim to answer
is whether an appropriate level of IPRs protection could help transforming the brain drain
caused by skilled emigration into a brain gain. In sum, we argue that although emigration
may directly result into a brain drain, it also causes a brain gain aﬀect, the extent of which
depends on the strength of IPRs protection.
The role of IPRs protection in any study that involves innovation and the developing
world is crucial. However, while the trade-oﬀ faced by an emerging economy between imita-
tion and the provision of incentives for domestic innovation through IPRs are clear (Maskus,
2000), the interrelationships between skilled migration and IPRs policy in determining inno-
vation remain to be explored. Our work fills this gap and contributes to the above mentioned
strand of research by capturing the diaspora dimension of migration and discovering how
IPRs protection in the sending country may influence the eﬀect of skilled migration on in-
5The Economist, "Give me your scientists...", March 7, 2009.
6 In this framework the capacity of innovation of the Southern innovators which remain in their origin
countries is related to their access to valuable technological knowledge partially accumulated abroad (i.e.
brain banks). On this issue, see Agrawal et al. (2011).
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novation there.7 On this basis, we shed light on the net impact of emigration on innovation
and show whether a strong IPRs regime at home can eventually turn the initial brain drain
into a brain gain.
Our theoretical framework is a standard occupational choice model in which emigration
reduces eﬀective innovation activities due to the loss of the most skilled (the extensive
margin). Migration however also opens a diaspora channel, through which the knowledge
acquired abroad can flow back into the innovation sector in the home economy and enhance
the skills of the remaining workers there (the intensive margin). To investigate whether
the beneficial eﬀects of diaspora could outweigh the direct negative eﬀects of the flow of
skilled workers, we look at the size and the average skills of the innovation sector. While a
strong level of IPRs protection directly increases the magnitude of gains from diaspora by
raising the returns to skills and expanding the innovation sector (thus causing the diaspora
eﬀect to fall on a larger range of workers actively using their skills in the economy), it also
endogenously increases the skill composition of the emigrants (thus leading to an increase
in the quality of skills learned and transmitted back home). As a consequence, a strong
level of IPRs protection in the sending country makes it more likely for diaspora gains to
outweigh the negative eﬀects of brain drain on innovation, thus facilitating a potential net
brain gain.8
Using a sample of emerging and developing economies, we then perfom an empirical
analysis to investigate the joint impact of emigration and IPRs protection in the sending
country on innovation there. The sample we use is a panel of 35 low-income countries rang-
ing from 1995 to 2006. We measure innovation activities in the South through the number
of resident patents with data taken from WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization).
We use this information together with extensive original data on migration flows and stocks
obtained from national statistical oﬃces and with the index of IPRs protection as measured
by Park (2008). Our findings show the impact of emigration on innovation to be positive in
7Among the vast literature on intellectual property rights, Chen and Puttinan (2005) and Parello (2008)
are perhaps most closely related to our work, as they specifically focus on domestic skill accumulation and
innovation. While the former relates positively IPRs protection to innovation, the latter deems it to be
ineﬀective for innovation in less developed countries.
8These results are in contrast to the theoretical conclusion obtained in McAusland and Kuhn (2011),
who claim IPRs to be an obstacle to the international flow of brains. In short, they argue that if brains are
emigrating, a country may as well lower its IPRs to free ride on brains that have moved elsewhere. While
their study is to our knowledge the first contribution which explicily investigates the link between IPRs and
brain circulation, it does not take into account any channels through which the skills acquired abroad can
be transferred back into the country of origin.
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the presence of strong IPRs protection. IPRs hence have a role in promoting the beneficial
eﬀects of the diaspora channel of knowledge, confirming the main conclusions of our theoret-
ical model. By conducting an empirical investigation focused on emerging and developing
countries, our work also contributes to the missing world of empirical analysis on innovation
and development in the South.9
In order to validate that our main empirical findings are mainly driven by the phenom-
enon of intellectual diaspora rather than by other compatible explanations, we also apply a
variant of the method proposed by Spilimbergo (2009). In particular, we construct a mea-
sure of emigration that makes it possible to relate an increase in resident patents granted in
a sending country to "where" the emigrants go. The underlying intuition is that emigrants
may better promote innovation in their home countries if their host countries have a higher
potential for innovation. This approach allows us to confirm that it is the skills learned from
abroad by emigrants and transferred back to their home country that increase successful
innovation there under strong IPRs, thus corroborating our theoretical conclusions.
In the remainder of the paper, we introduce the theory in section 2, the empirical exercise
in section 3, and conclude in section 4.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Framework
Suppose there are two regions: a developing economy referred to as the South, and an
alternative North with better economic opportunities and employment possibilities, where
skills and wages are higher by assumption. As the focus of our study is the Southern
market, we concentrate our analysis on goods invented, produced and consumed locally in
the South.10 Consumers have the following utility function:
 =  =
⎡
⎣
Z
0
 
⎤
⎦
1

 (1)
9 Indeed, while innovation has been deemed central to economic take-oﬀ, catch-up, and development in
low-income countries, research on innovation tends to neglect developing countries, leaving a large gap in
economic literature (Lorentzen and Mohamed, 2010).
10To single out the impact of migration from South to North on local innovation, we abstract from trade-
related issues. For s study of the trade and migration in an occupational choice model see Iranzo and Peri
(2009). While their study is not innovation-related, Davis and Naghavi (2010) explore the eﬀects of trade
and oﬀshoring on innovation and growth in a similar but dynamic occupational choice setting.
5
where individual consumption  is divided between a continuum of  invented goods
subscripted by  ∈ (0), and  ∈ (0 1) represents the inverse measure of product diﬀer-
entiation.
There are two sectors in the economy, a production and an innovation sector. Labor is
the only factor of production and innovation, and is mobile between sectors. Workers are
spread over a continuum of skills  ∈ [0∞), distributed with density () and cumulative
distribution (). We normalize the mass of workers to one. While production does not
require skills, a worker  with skills  in the innovation sector has productivity  such that
() =  +  (2)
where  represents own skill endowment and  (defined below) is spillovers of knowledge
learned by emigrants abroad through what we call the "diaspora" channel.
The timing of the model is as follows. Nature reveals the IPRs regime exogenous to our
model. Emigration takes place in period 0, activating the diaspora channel. Innovation is
then carried out in the first period, and production occurs in the second.
The core of our analysis deals with the events that occur in period 0. We first study the
implications of the IPR regime, which determines the size of the innovation sector and the
skill composition of migration. We then look at the impact of emigration on innovation,
measured by average skills to represent eﬀective innovation activities in that sector, given
the IPR regime in the South.
Emigration in period 0 is modelled as a movement of labor from the South to the North
at a cost  , which allows only the highest skilled to move. Potential diaspora is then
realized by means of skilled emigrants transferring their newly acquired knowledge back to
the South. We define the positive externalities from diaspora networks as
 = ˜ (3)
where the average skills endowment of those who migrate to the North is ˜  0. Parameter
 ≥ 0 measures the intensity of diasporas, which is influenced by factors such as the level
of academic and professional interactions and the amount of skills learned in the North, or
the successful transmission of knowledge to and the absorptive capacity of the South. Note
that  = 0 implies no international knowledge transfer,  = 1 the return of only original
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(pre-migration) skills of emigrants, and   1 the diﬀusion of their improved skills to the
South.
In period 1,  goods are invented. Each good needs  units of skills. Total amount of
human capital in the economy can be written as
() =
∞Z
1
() (4)
where 1 represents the skills of a threshold worker indiﬀerent between working in the
production or the innovation sector. The total number of goods available for consumption
are
 = () = () (5)
In order to work in the innovation sector, each worker must go through training at a cost ,
which is paid in the second period. Eﬀective wage (wage per unit of skill) for the high-skilled
in the innovation sector is equal to  and is paid in period 2, giving each individual with
skills  a wage equivalent to  .
In period 2, the production sector absorbs all workers who have not worked in the
innovation sector in the first period. The production function is CRS in labor and has
productivity equal to one, so that there is a one to one relationship between output and
labor,  =  . Individual wage is identical for all workers in this sector and equals .
2.2 Patents and Consumption
We use the basic framework in Saint-Paul (2003, 2004) as our benchmark, modelling IPR
protection as the probability that an innovator can obtain monopoly power over his inven-
tion.11 The probability of being granted a patent is , which captures the degree of IPR
protection.12 The price of a non-patented good is equal to its marginal cost normalized to
one, which also gives us wages in the production sector  =  = 1. Otherwise, if a patent
is granted, a firm charges monopoly price  = , which is a mark-up over marginal cost
 = 1 (6)
11Saint Paul (2004) uses this setting to explore the implications of IPR and redistribution on occupational
choice and welfare.
12Grossman and Lai (2004) also model patent protection in a similar manner.
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Next, consumption is divided between patented and non-patented goods,  and 
respectively. Consumers allocate their income  (net of training costs) between the two
types of goods by maximizing (1) or equivalently
  
 +(1− )  (7)
under the budget constraint
 =  +(1− )  (8)
The solution to the above maximization problem is:
 =    =


1
(−1)  (9)
where
 = (1− ) + (−1) (10)
captures the love of variety eﬀect as   0, and the disutility caused by monopoly
pricing as   0.
Using (1), (7), (9) and (10), aggregate consumption index is therefore
 = 
 (−1)
=

 
where  =  (−1) is the aggregate price index.
The value of a patent, which is equal to monopoly profit, is equal to
 = (− 1) 
1
(−1)
  (11)
where  is aggregate income (net of training cost). In the above expression, the first term
on the RHS is the mark-up while the second is total demand for the patented good.
Under a competitive labor market, expected profit from inventing a new good must equal
to its cost in terms of skills so that
 =  
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This gives
 = (− 1)  1(−1)  (12)
As we are interested in the direct eﬀect of strengthening IPR protection (which corresponds
to an increase in ) on employment in the innovation sector, we partially diﬀerentiate (12)
with respect to  to get

 =
(− 1)  1(−1) + (1−  (−1) )
22  0 (13)
Recalling that   1 and   1, the sign of the derivative in (13) reveals that stronger
patent protection increases eﬀective wages in the innovation sector. Notice that this has no
eﬀect on the skills of each individual worker and only changes average skills by increasing
the returns to working in the innovation sector, hence expanding its size. While the size
of the innovation sector is given by equation (4), the average level of skills in the South is
denoted by
˜ = 1
1−(1)
∞Z
1
() (14)
Diﬀerentiating (14) with respect to 1 reflects the basic results from the occupational choice
model of Roy (1951). Since ˜1  0, the entry of less skilled workers in the innovation sector
reduces average skills there. This could also be interpreted as a negative direct eﬀect of IPRs
caused by a misallocation of the low-skilled to the innovation sector. This is in line with
Glass and Saggi (1998) and Vandenbussche, et al. (2006), who argue that a shift of such
workers away from less-skill intensive activities such as imitation could have adverse eﬀects
for countries far from the technological frontier. In our analysis below we show how this
reallocation of workers following an improvement of IPRs can be beneficial due to diaspora
gains.
2.3 Innovation and Migration
A worker with skill level  can either work in the innovation sector and earn  −  or
become a production worker with wage  = 1, choosing the option that generates a higher
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income. Therefore, given   1, a worker chooses to work in the innovation sector if13
 −   1⇒ 1 = 1 +   (15)
Lemma 1 The threshold skill level 1, which determines the equilibrium allocation of work-
ers between the production and the innovation sector, is decreasing in eﬀective wages 
as 1 = −1+  0: higher eﬀective skilled wages in the South shift workers from the
production to the innovation sector.
A worker migrates to the North if his gains from doing so net migration costs exceed
what he would earn in the innovation sector at home:
 − −   2 − ⇒ 2 =  −   (16)
where we assume an exogenous eﬀective wage in the innovation sector of the North higher
than that in the South:    .
Lemma 2 The threshold skill level 2, which distinguishes emigrants from non-emigrants,
is increasing in eﬀective wages  as 2 = (−)2  0: higher eﬀective skilled wages
in the South discourages emigration to the North.
Observing (15) and (16) together reveals the size of the innovation sector. It is derived
from the brain drain eﬀect which relates to migration of the highly skilled population (lower
2) and from the eﬀect of the movement of workers from the production to the innovation
sector as a result of stronger IPRs (lower 1). Higher moving costs  deter emigration and
preserve the size of the innovation sector; higher training costs to work in the innovation
sector  decrease the size by preventing the low skilled from entering the innovation sector;
higher prospective wages abroad  encourage the flow of skills away from the country,
while higher wages in the innovation sector at home  attract workers from the production
sector and reduce skilled emigration.
13Using  instead of  from (2) to find the threshold in (15) follows from the assumption that a worker
does not take into account potential spillovers of knowledge learned by emigrants abroad, when choosing
his occupation or deciding whether or not to migrate. This assumption avoids the anticipation of potential
benefits from diaspora and free-riding on migration by others.
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Finally, stronger IPR protection discourages emigration by the lower end of skilled work-
ers. Defining
˜ = 1
1−(2)
∞Z
2
() (17)
as the average skill composition of migrants, stronger IPRs increase the skill intensity of
migration by limiting the migrants to those with highest skills, as ˜2  0.14
Lemma 3 Given Lemma 2 along with the definition of ˜ in (17), ˜2  0 implies that
a higher in 2 increases the skill intensity of migration as long as the number of migrants is
greater than zero, i.e. 2 ∞⇒ (2)  1.
2.4 Equilibrium
The economy is in equilibrium when the allocation of workers across sectors is compatible
with the labor and product market clearing conditions. Recall that the total number of
workers in the production sector in terms of the threshold skill level 1 is
 = (1) =
1Z
0
() = (1) (18)
and that total skills in the innovation sector in terms of 1 and 2 are expressed by
() = (1 2) =
2Z
1
() (19)
Market clearing implies that total output net training cost  is equal to total factor
income:15
 = (1 2) + (1) (20)
This equilibrium condition can equivalently be written through the labor market clearing
condition
(1) = [(1− )] +
  1(−1)
  (21)
14Total skills of emigrants increases as more workers move to the North, while their average skills fall
since every new migrating worker is endowed with lower initial skills (˜2  0).
15 In what follows, we assume training costs  to be embedded in  , which simplifies the notation but does
not influence the results.
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where the first and the second term on the RHS derive from total consumer demand for the
non-patented and patented goods respectively.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We can close the model by using equations (5), (10), (12), and (20) to solve for the
equilibrium eﬀective wage in terms of 1 and 2:
 = (1 2) = (− 1)
1
(−1)(1)
+(1 2)[1− (1−  (−1) )]
 (22)
The following two-equations system allows us to calculate the dynamics of 1 and 2:
1(1 2) = 1 +  (23)
2(1 2) = 2 − 
Equilibrium eﬀective wage (1 2) and the conditions in (23) can be interpreted as follows.
We saw from (12) that an increase in the level of IPR protection raises the eﬀective wage
associated with one unit of skill. As the wage of the worker with skills 1 in the innovation
sector net of training cost is always equal to unity, an increase in  is always followed by a
fall in 1 as (1)1  0 in the numerator and (1 2)1  0 in the denominator
work to keep the wage of the new (lower skilled) threshold worker net training cost equal
to unity.
In addition, rewriting equilibrium conditions in (23) as
1(− 1) 1(−1)(1) = (1 + )
n
+(1 2)[1− (1−  (−1) )]
o
 (24)
2(− 1) 1(−1)(1) = (2 −  )
n
+(1 2)[1− (1−  (−1) )]
o

we can easily see that thresholds 1 and 2 must move in opposite directions, i.e. 21 
0. This is so because the LHS of (24) is strictly increasing in 1, while the RHS is decreas-
ing in 1 through (1 2). Migration threshold 2 must therefore increase to reestablish
equilibrium as (1 2)2  0.16
Redefining averages skills from (14) after adding threshold 1 to account for migration,
16See Appendix for a formal proof and the derivation of the total derivatives.
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we have
˜ = 1(2)−(1)
2Z
1
() (25)
Diﬀerentiating (25) with respect to 1 and 2 gives ˜1  0 and ˜2  0.
Lemma 4 Given (25) along with Lemmas 1-2, a rise in per unit wages of the skilled in the
South lowers average skills ˜ ( ˜  0) if
¯¯¯
1
¯¯¯

¯¯¯
2
¯¯¯
, and increases it if the opposite
holds.
We can conclude that an increase in the IPR protection level  shifts workers from the
production to the innovation sector, increasing the size of the latter and lowering average
skills in the South. However, Lemma 4 shows that IPR protection does not only imply an
expansion of the innovation sector by lowering 1, but also via increasing 2 as 21  0.
This reduced migration works against the negative impact of IPRs on average skills in the
innovation sector, and at the same time increases the skill composition of the emigrants
˜ from Lemma 3. The impact of IPR enforcement on the home economy is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Proposition 5 A stronger level of IPR protection in the South (higher ) increases the
returns to working in the innovation sector  and therefore (1) expands the size of the
innovation sector from both ends of the spectrum (21  0) by reducing 1 (1  0) and
raising 2 (2  0); (2) increases the skill intensity of migration by increasing ˜ through a
larger 2.
Proof. See (13), (24), (17), and the Appendix.
We now turn to analyze the conditions under which skilled emigration could promote
innovation in the South. In particular, we study how emigration changes the level of skills
in the South, and how the magnitude of this eﬀect is determined by the IPRs regime. We
then explore when the beneficial eﬀects of cross-border diaspora are likely to outweigh the
negative brain drain eﬀect of emigration on innovation and transform it into brain gain.17
17The brain gain channel which we refer to has a diﬀerent interpretation from that of the relevant literature.
While the literature on brain gain and development highlights that the brain gain channel is realized through
an increase in the incentives for human capital formation in the sending countries, in our framework the
brain gain channel is realized through an increase in the size and average skill level of the innovation sector
of the origin country. Both interpretations, however, lead to the same conclusion: under certain conditions,
skilled emigration could be beneficial for growth in the sending countries.
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2.5 Intellectual Property Rights and Diaspora
In order to measure the net eﬀect of migration on innovation in the South, we must weight
the magnitude of the negative brain drain eﬀect against gains brought about by the diaspora
channel. Brain drain can be summarized as the direct loss of skills embedded in workers who
migrate abroad, i.e. the extensive margin. This is in other words the amount of skills initially
available prior to migration minus the base skills of the remaining workers post-migration:
 =
∞Z
1
() −
2Z
1
() =
∞Z
2
() (26)
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Next, we rewrite the aggregate supply of skills as
(1 2) =
2Z
1
( + )() =
2Z
1
( + ˜)() =
2Z
1
() + 
2Z
1
˜() (27)
The first term on the RHS represents the amount of skill workers in the innovation sector
are originally endowed with, and the second term the aggregate diaspora eﬀect on the same
workers still residing in the South, i.e. the intensive margin.18 Such potential gains from
diaspora are illustrated in Figure 2. The second term on the RHS of (27) denotes the virtual
return of upgraded skills through diaspora and can be rewritten to define brain gain as
 = 
2Z
1
˜() = ˜
2Z
1
() = ˜[(2)−(1)] = (2)−(1)
1−(2)
∞Z
2
() (28)
where [(2)−(1)] represents the size of the innovation sector, which is then multiplied
by the diaspora term ˜ to account for the total eﬀect of the latter on innovation in the
home economy. Recall that an improvement of the IPR regime increases returns to skills
(working in the innovation sector) by increasing eﬀective wages  . This results in an
expansion of the innovation sector by reducing 1 and increasing 2. The RHS of equation
(28) reveals that protecting IPRs increases the number of workers in the innovation sector
that can benefit from diaspora by enlarging [(2) − (1)] The diaspora mechanism is
depicted in Figure 3. Emigration also increases brain gain by enhancing the level of skills ˜
18Note that emigrants are excluded when summing up local skills in the South.
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that can be transferred back to the home country. This secondary eﬀect however disappears
if we take into account the number of emigrants, which implies multiplying the RHS of (28)
with 1−(2). As it will be clarified below, this eﬀect is not necessary for our results and
removing it simply limits the channels of gains from diaspora to the one associated with the
size of the innovation sector.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
To see whether the brain gain eﬀects caused by a diaspora channel could dominate the
physical escape of skills caused by brain drain we must calculate the net eﬀect of migration
on total human capital in the sending country and test whether
 − ≷ 0 (29)
∞Z
2
() − (2)−(1)
1−(2)
∞Z
2
() ≷ 0
(2)−(1)
1−(2) ≡ Φ ≷ 1
As seen above, the term Φ ≡ (2)−(1)1−(2) can take a value greater or less than one. Brain
gains through diaspora dominate when Φ  1, which is more likely for high levels of IPR
protection because 1  0⇒ 0(1)  0⇒ Φ1  0 and 2  0⇒ 0(2)  0⇒ Φ2  0.
As a result, IPRs indirectly promote brain gains by increasing the size of the innovation
sector and the quality of diaspora, even if it could directly reduce average skills in the
innovation sector (see Lemma 4).
Proposition 6 Given proposition 1 and equation (29), gains from diaspora could outweigh
the direct loss of skills caused by migration if the IPR regime in the South is suﬃciently
strong, so that (2)−(1)1−(2) ≡ Φ  1 holds. This is so because 1. diasporas from the
North reach out a larger number of workers who use their skills in the innovation sector:
[(2)−(1)]
  0; 2. the average skills of migrants ˜ and hence the quality of skills acquired
abroad and transmitted back is higher:
[ 11−(2) ]  0.
Proof. See equation (29), Proposition 1, and Lemmas 3-4.
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2.6 Summary and Main Empirical Implications
In our theoretical model we investigate under what circumstances skilled emigration may
be beneficial for development. We show that this occurs in the presence of a strong IPR
regime, which may turn a brain drain into a brain gain.
In our framework a country’s potential for innovation is influenced both by the size and
average skill level of the innovation sector and by the average skill level of migrants. An
increase in the size and average skill level of the innovation sector, as well as an increase
in the average skill level of migrants, increase the absorptive capacity of the country where
migration originates from, thus leading to stronger beneficial eﬀects of cross-border diaspora
networks. These beneficial eﬀects are larger the bigger is the innovation sector, which occurs
under strong patent protection.
The mechanism at work is as follows. Emigration has two eﬀects. On the one hand, it
decreases the average skills of the innovation sector ˜ since the implied loss of the most skilled
induces a lower 2 (the extensive margin). On the other hand, it increases the skills of the
remaining workers in the innovation sector because of the diaspora channel (the intensive
margin). This latter eﬀect occurs through ˜, which enhances the skills of all remaining
individuals in the innovation sector as long as   0. The IPR regime also aﬀects innovation
in two ways. On the one hand, it aﬀects the size of the innovation sector. On the other
hand, it endogenously influences the skill composition of the emigrants. Indeed, an increase
in IPRs protection enhances the attractiveness of working in the innovation sector, by thus
increasing its size from both ends of the spectrum: it causes a move of the low skilled workers
from the production to the innovation sector (i.e. 1 falls) and it reduces emigration (i.e. 2
rises). With a larger innovation sector, the potential for absorption of the newly acquired
skills from the North (˜) is higher, as the diaspora eﬀect falls on a larger range of workers
(i.e. a larger ()). At the same time, a reduction in the number of emigrants (i.e. a larger
2) leads to a increase in their average skills ˜, and hence to an increase in the quality of
the skills that can be sent back to the original country.
This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the gains in human capital from
diaspora are more likely to outweigh the direct drain of skills caused by emigration under a
stronger IPRs regime. The main testable implications of our model are the following:
1. Abstracting from IPRs protection, skilled emigration is harmful for the origin country’s
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potential for development, leading only to brain drain.
2. In the presence of IPRs protection, skilled emigration could be beneficial for innova-
tion. This occurs when the level of IPRs protection in the origin country is suﬃciently
strong. In such a case, the IPRs regime may help transform a brain drain in a net
brain gain.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Specification
Our empirical analysis focuses on a sample composed by emerging and developing countries
(EDC) as classified by IMF (2010). We make this choice because our theoretical model
specifically concentrates on the determinants of innovation in developing countries. The
dataset is an unbalanced panel including 35 countries and covering the time interval from
1995 to 2006.19 The unit of analysis is a country-year.
The innovation measure we adopt is resident patent applications, i.e. the patent ap-
plications by residents of each country to the local national patent oﬃce. Additional tests
will be done using patent grants.20 Patent data are from the WIPO database. Our main
migration measure is the gross flow of emigrants. An alternative migration measure is gross
migrant stock, which we use in our robustness checks. The data on emigration flows and
stocks are retrieved by aggregating original bilateral yearly data on immigrant flows and
stocks by country of origin into 27 receiving OECD countries.21 Intellectual property rights
are measured through the Park (2008) index of IPRs protection. For all details about our
data and sources, see Appendix.
To investigate whether in the presence of emigration brain gains are more likely to prevail
under stronger IPR regimes, we explicitly focus on the interrelationships between migration
and IPRs protection. To this end, we study the determinants of innovation with the help of an
19The list of countries in our sample is reported in Appendix.
20On the benefits of using patent statistics to measure innovation, see Griliches (1990). Along with input
data such as R&D expenditures and the human capital employed in research, patents have become the most
common measure of innovation output (Hall et al. 2001) and of knowledge spillovers (Mancusi 2008).
21Although for our analysis it would have been ideal to use data on skilled emigration, detailed statistics
on the skill composition of emigrants by origin countries are available only for the two most recent census
years (1990 and 2000) or, at maximum, every 5-years (from 1975 till 2000), but only with reference to the six
major receiving OECD countries. For details about emigration data by skill levels, see Beine et al. (2010)
and Defoort (2008).
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empirical specification which introduces the following key variables: migration, intellectual
property rights protection and the interaction between migration and IPRs protection.
The baseline specification we adopt is the following:
 = 0+1−5+2−1+3−5−1+γ+−1++
where  denotes the country and  the year. The dependent variable  is our measure
of innovation. The variable  represents emigration and is taken with a five-years lag,
to take into account the time needed for the emigrants to acquire skills in the destination
and interact to transfer the knowledge to their home countries.22  is the measure
of IPRs protection and is taken with one lag, to avoid endogeneity issues. The variable
−5−1 is the interaction term between emigration and IPRs protection. The
cumulative eﬀect of migration on innovation is then captured by 1 and 3−1 and
varies with the level of IPRs protection.  and −1 are population and GDP per
capita, which are included to account for size eﬀects, with a lag in case of GDP because of
potential endogeneity issues. Finally, the ’s are country-specific characteristics and  is
the error term.
Following the related literature, we complete the baseline specification in our empirical
analysis by including a number of relevant controls. First of all, we add patent stock, which
can be considered as a proxy for a country’s absorptive capacity (Hall et al., 2001). Its
potential eﬀect on the amount of innovation activities is positive.23 We also add R&D
expenditure, which is considered a proxy for a country’s potential for innovation and is
expected to positively influence innovation. A further relevant control is education, an
additional proxy for the ability to absorb new knowledge. The education measure we use is
tertiary education, which we believe could best capture this ability. Government spending is
next added to measure the degree of economic freedom. Finally, trade and FDI are included
in the light of a rich literature on North-South trade and FDI as determinants of innovation
in low-income countries. In our empirical analysis all additional controls except education
22 In the case of patent grants, this also pertains to the time needed to create a patent.
23To derive the patent stock series we use the perpetual inventory method (Coe and Helpman, 2005).
Patent stock () of country  at time  is  = −1(1−)+−1, where  is the depreciation rate
and  is patent flow. The initial value of patent stock (i.e. at time 0) is expressed by: 0 = 0(+),
where  is the average growth rate of patent flow (Griliches, 1980). We assume a depretiation rate of 15%
(Hall et al., 2001) and take  as the average growth rate of patents in the first decade of available and
reliable data of the patent series, i.e. starting from year 1990. As specified in the Appendix, the patent
series start from 1985. However, consistent and complete data are only available form the 1990s.
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are taken with one lag to avoid potential endogeneity issues. For details on the sources of
the control variables, see Appendix. Table 1 illustrates the summary statistics of the key
variables of our analysis with reference to the sample under consideration.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3.2 Results
Table 2 presents our results using resident patent applications as dependent variable. The
migration variable is gross emigration flows. We initially consider our baseline specification
with all the three main variables of interest (migration, IPRs protection and the interaction
between emigration and IPRs) and the two key controls for size eﬀects (population and
GDP per capita). 24 All estimations include country and time eﬀects and are performed
using fixed eﬀects regression methods.25 All variables are expressed in logarithms except
those indicating shares.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Column (1) in Table 2 shows that our three main variables of interest are highly signifi-
cant. The negative and significant coeﬃcient of emigration suggests that migration by itself
could induce brain drain. At the same time, there is a negative and significant eﬀect of IPRs
on patents, suggesting that IPRs protection by itself does not increase domestic innovation
in developing countries (Qin, 2007). This eﬀect could also be due to the fact that a high
degree of IPRs protection reduces the propensity to innovate by blocking essential techno-
logical spillovers that in developing countries are only possible through imitation (Madsen
et al., 2010). Nevertheless, key to our analysis is the interaction term between migration
and IPRs protection, which reveals to be highly significant and positive. This suggests that
IPRs protection helps the diaspora channel of knowledge that originates from migration.
24Since our sample begins in 1995, the first observation of the lagged migration variable dates back to
1990.
25Our estimation strategy takes into account the characteristics of the WIPO data and the specificity of
patent data at country level. While Table 1 shows that in our sample there is no country with zero patents,
it may also happen that very poor countries may not report this variable. As a consequence, a missing
data could actually represent a zero. However, since WIPO estimates the data missing for a given oﬃce or
period of time from the available data and includes them in aggregate totals, our missing data on patents
at country level are actual missing data and should not represent zeros. Where data is missing for a given
oﬃce or period of time, WIPO estimates the missing data from the available
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This also means that above a certain threshold level of IPRs protection migration induces
brain gain, thus mirroring the conclusion we derive in our theoretical model.26
In column (1) of Table 2 our two size controls (population and GDP per capita) are
positive and significant, as expected. Columns (2) to (7) in turn add to the baseline spec-
ification our additional controls: patent stock, R&D expenditure, education, government
spending, trade and FDI. The results show that patent stock and R&D expenditure are
positive and significant determinants of innovation. The positive sign of patent stock sug-
gests that innovation is stronger in the presence of a higher level of absorptive capacity:
this implicitly confirms that the diaspora channel of knowledge is eﬀective when the ability
to absorb new knowledge is high. The positive sign of R&D is intuitive and follows the
main predictions of the relevant literature: the more eﬀorts are devoted to R&D, the bigger
is a country’s potential for innovation. Tertiary education appears to be insignificant in
this framework: its negative sign could be due to the fact that highly educated people in
developing countries may prefer to apply for patents in more advanced economies.27 In this
specification, both trade and FDI are positive as expected, but not significant.28 Finally,
column (8) simultaneously adds all controls into the specification.29 As the results show,
the coeﬃcients of our three main variables of interest remain significant and of the same
sign as in the baseline specification: migration is negative and significant, IPRs protection
is negative and significant and the interaction term between migration and IPRs protection
is positive and significant.30
3.2.1 Robustness Tests
In Table 3 we perform two diﬀerent robustness checks for our results. The dependent vari-
able is again patent applications. To further investigate the issue of omitted variables, we
26 In the following we will perform a specific test for this eﬀect.
27Although tertiary education has here a non-significant coeﬃcient, we also find that primary education
aﬀects positively and significantly the number of patents granted. The results are available upon request.
We do not present the results with primary education as we believe tertiary education to be more relevant in
a study of the determinants of innovation. Related to this, it is worth pointing out that even after controlling
for the extent of human capital the eﬀects of our three main variables of interest remain significant.
28This suggests that international technology transfer is not necessarily due to trade and FDI and at the
same time reinforces our view that migration plays an important role in innovation.
29We here exclude R&D expenditure since there is a large number of missing data for this variable
and consequently including R&D our sample reduces to a large extent (i.e. the initial sample looses 200
observations). The results with all controls including R&D are in line with the other results and are available
upon request.
30To check whether the eﬀect of emigration on innovation is due to capital independently from knowledge
transfers, we also investigated the role of remittances. In our specifications, remittances are not significant.
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first estimate our key specifications in first diﬀerences, thus choosing a diﬀerent estima-
tion methodology with respect to fixed eﬀects. While the fixed eﬀects (within) estimator
is derived by subtracting the time-average model from the original model, the first diﬀer-
ence estimator is obtained by subtracting the model lagged by one period from the original
model. In other words, the first diﬀerence model removes the time-invariant individual com-
ponents by first-diﬀerencing the data. The relative eﬃciency of the first diﬀerence estimator
with respect to the fixed eﬀect estimator depends on the properties of the error term. In
particular, the first diﬀerence estimator requires weaker exogeneity assumptions and it is
usually preferred if the errors are serially correlated. Indeed, while the fixed eﬀects esti-
mator assumes that the error terms are serially uncorrelated, the first diﬀerence estimator
only assumes that the first diﬀerences in the errors are uncorrelated. The results of first
diﬀerence estimates are displayed in the first two columns of Table 3. We here test the
robustness of our results illustrating two of the key specifications we find most relevant:
the specification with the significant controls, i.e. size (population and GDP per capita)
and absorptive capacity (patent stock), in column 1, and our full specification, in column
2. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term between IPRs protection and migration remains
positive and significant, while that of IPRs protection remains negative and significant and
migration looses significance.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The last two columns of Table 3 perform a diﬀerent robustness check. We here adopt the
same estimation methodology as before (i.e. fixed eﬀects) but use an alternative measure of
migration. Instead of using flows, we use gross emigration stocks, largely exploited in the
reference literature. As we can see from the table, all results are in line with the previous
findings: our three main variables of interest are significant and of the same sign as before.
3.2.2 A Measure of Successful Innovation
We here go a step further and investigate the eﬀect of emigration and IPRs protection
using a diﬀerent measure of innovation: resident patent grants. A key diﬀerence between
patent applications and patent grants is that while patent applications can be considered a
general proxy for innovation activities, patent grants can be thought as a proxy for successful
innovation. Patent grants hence represent a "stronger" measure of innovation. The results
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of our key specifications are reported in Table 4. In the first two columns we use emigration
flows as migration measure, while in the last two columns we use emigration stocks. As we
can see from the table, the results persist and thus reinforce our previous findings.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
To investigate in detail whether and under what conditions migration induces a brain
drain or a brain gain, we now explicitly consider the eﬀect of emigration on innovation with
variations in level of IPRs. Figure 4 illustrates the joint impact of emigration and IPRs
protection on patent grants for the specification which includes all controls and emigration
flows as the migration measure (i.e. column 2). The figure shows the marginal eﬀect of
emigration on resident patent grants for diﬀerent levels of IPRs protection, together with
its 95% confidence interval.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
As the figure suggests, while in correspondence to weak IPRs protection the eﬀect of
migration on resident patents is negative and significant, under strong IPRs protection
migration has a positive and significant eﬀect on innovation. In line with the predictions of
our theoretical model (see condition (29)), this confirms that emigration fosters innovation
through diaspora, as long as the IPRs regime is strong. It is important to point out that, even
if we could interpret this result as the interaction between IPRs and diaspora, there could
be other explanations of why IPRs foster innovation. For example, since skilled emigration
increases the returns to skills, the country of origin may have a higher incentive to invest in
education. The presence of a higher degree of IPRs protection could then make this incentive
even stronger, thus generating a higher potential for innovation. This interpretation is in
line with the traditional explanation of brain gain.
3.2.3 The Emigration Index
We now propose an alternative approach to evaluate the impact of emigration on innovation
in less developed countries. As it is likely that the intensity of knowledge transferred back to
the countries of origin depends on how technologically advanced is the destination country,
a more precise measure of emigration should take into account the heterogeneity of the host
countries.
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In our empirical investigation we have so far considered the total gross emigration
flows/stocks of each emerging country to 27 diﬀerent OECD countries, thus not making
any distinctions between the destinations. We now instead assign diﬀerent weights to the
emigration data according to the destination countries in order to take into account poten-
tial diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of the cross-border transfer of skills. The weights are
based on a proxy of the innovation potential in each destination country. The purpose is
to explore whether and to what extent the number of resident patents at home changes
according to "where" emigrants go.
The strategy we apply is a variant of the approach introduced by Spilimbergo (2009) to
investigate the transfer of norms. While Spilimbergo argues that foreign-trained individuals
promote democracy in their home countries if they study in democratic countries, we here
argue that emigrants promote innovation in their home countries if their host countries have
a high potential for innovation. In order to capture the heterogeneity among destination
countries we construct an emigration index defined as the weighted average of emigration
flows (or stocks) with weights depending on the level of development in each host country.
The emigration index of the origin country  is defined as:
  =
X


 
where  is the origin country,  is destination country and  denotes time.  is the bilateral
emigration flow (or stock) from country  to country , is total emigration flow (or stock)
from country , and  is an index of technological progress of country .31 This emigration
index lies between 0 and 1; the index is 1 if all emigrants go to the most advanced countries
and 0 if all emigrants are in countries with the lowest potential for innovation. Since  is a
proxy for the potential for innovation, it is reasonable to expect that emigrants who are in
countries characterized by a high degree of development could benefit more in terms of skill
accumulation with respect to the others. This line of reasoning could allow us to interpret
this index as a measure of emigration that considers diﬀerent levels of skills.
To construct the index, the development measure we adopt is the GDP per capita of each
destination country.32 The chosen measure of home innovation is resident patent grants,
31Bilateral migration flows and stocks are present in our original dataset on migration flows and stocks
(see Appendix). The dataset is thus here fully exploited.
32Alternative measures of the potential for innovation are R&D expenditure and resident patents in the
host country. We do not use R&D expenditure since the data on R&D are scarse and lead us to loose too
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which are the actual output of successful innovation. Notice that this test is more sensible
for patent grants as opposed to patent applications because patent granted are the output
of successful innovation, which is the revelant measure when investigating the eﬀect of the
"quality" of skills learned from abroad.
Our findings are reported in Table 5. The dependent variable is resident patent grants
per thousand of population, which is a measure of patent intensity. The first two columns
refer to emigration flows, whereas the last two refer to emigration stocks.33
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The findings show that our key variables are always significant and of the same sign as in
the previous regressions. In particular, the interaction between "skill-corrected" emigration
and IPRs protection is positive and highly significant across all diﬀerent estimations. In
column 2 and 4 government spending shows to be negative and significant. The negative
sign of government spending could be explained by the fact that a low share of government
spending appears to be positively related to the degree of economic freedom as measured
by the country’s reliance on personal choice and markets (Gwartney and Lawson, 2000). In
column 2 FDI reveals to be negative and significant. This could be explained by the fact
that inward FDI has a negative eﬀect on the productivity of local domestic firms through the
existence of negative externalities (Aitken and Harrison, 1999) and/or that foreign entrants
often displace local firms to less-innovative market segments (see e.g. Cantwell, 1989).
In conclusion, also taking into account diﬀerent degrees of eﬀectiveness of skill transfers
among destination countries, the results show that the brain gain impact of emigration on
innovation in less developed countries increases with the degree of IPRs protection. This
reinforces our theoretical hypothesis and validates that our results are mainly driven by the
diaspora channel under study rather than by other compatible explanations.
3.2.4 Summing Up
To sum up, in the empirical specifications we consider the eﬀects of our three main variables
of interest on patents are the same and largely robust: migration is negative and significant,
many observations. We do not use resident patents since a great number of patents by OECD residents are
supplied to the European Patent Oﬃce, thus making very diﬃcult to impute to each country the appropriate
number of resident patents.
33 In our sample of 35 EDC countries, the emigration index lies between 0.375 and 0.798 if emigration
flows are considered, while it lies between 0.327 and 0.8 if emigration stocks are considered.
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IPRs protection is negative and significant and the interaction term between migration and
IPR protection is positive and significant. In addition, the impact of migration on innovation
reveals to be positive and significant in correspondence to higher levels of IPRs protection.
These results shed light on the role of IPRs protection in promoting the beneficial eﬀects
of the diaspora channel of knowledge, thus confirming the main insights of our theoretical
model. It is important to point out that although our results are derived in terms of
total migration, it is possible to draw similar conclusions also in terms of skilled migration.
Indeed, as shown before, all our main results hold when using our "skill-corrected" measure
of migration. In addition, it is true that starting from the 1990s migration to the OECD area
has been increasingly composed of high skilled immigrants who originate from developing
countries (Douquier and Rappoport, 2010).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the link between cross-border diaspora networks and the
capacity of innovation of a country where emigration originates from. The perspective we
adopt is that of a developing country. We argue that although skilled emigration out of a
developing country may directly result in the well-known concept of brain drain, it can also
cause an indirect brain gain eﬀect, the extent of which depends on the level of intellectual
property rights protection in the origin country. The paper conducts a joint theoretical and
empirical analysis of this issue.
The theoretical model relates a country’s potential for innovation to the size and average
skills of its innovation sector, as well as to the average skills of migrants. Our framework
draws upon the realistic assumption that emigration may originate cross-border diaspora
networks between skilled emigrants and natives. It turns out in the presence of a strong IPRs
regime the gains in human capital deriving from the diaspora channel of knowledge are more
likely to outweigh the direct drain of skills caused by emigration. As a consequence, when
patents are suﬃciently protected, informal networks of emigrants and people remaining at
home are crucial in turning a brain drain into a brain gain. The main conclusions of our
theoretical analysis are then tested in our empirical investigation. Using a sample of EDC
economies, we show that the impact of emigration on innovation is positive in the presence
of strong IPRs protection, thus confirming our main theoretical insights. Our key empirical
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findings are confirmed using a number of diﬀerent robustness checks.
The results of the paper shed light on the joint role of institutions and migration in
promoting growth, by thus contributing to the rich debate about the brain drain/brain gain
eﬀects of emigration. In particular, we explicitly model a process of transfer of knowledge
from developed to developing countries which is independent of trade and FDI and which
mainly relies on people’s movement. In addition, the paper fills a gap in the rich literature
on diaspora networks, by directly focussing on the potential relationship between knowledge
absorbed by emigrants abroad and growth in their home countries.
A Appendix
A.1 Country list
Our sample consists of 35 emerging and developing countries (EDC). The countries are
the following: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia,
Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland.
Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam.
A.2 Data Description and Sources
Patents
We use two series of patent data: resident patent applications and resident patent grants.
Resident patent applications are patent applications by residents of each country to the
local national patent oﬃce. Resident patent grants are patents granted in each country to
its residents by the local national patent oﬃce. The data are annual and start in 1985. The
source is WIPO (2010). Patent stock series are calculated using the perpetual inventory
method and a 15% depreciation rate. For details on this method, see the text.
Migration
We use two series of migration data: emigration flows out of each country and stocks
of emigrants abroad. The data are annual. Emigration flows and stocks are derived by
summing up available bilateral immigration flows and stocks by country of origin into 27
OECD countries. The original bilateral migration dataset has been kindly provided by
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Mariola Pytlikova and collects information from diﬀerent statistical oﬃces of the world,
supplemented by published OECD statistics from “Trends in International Migration” pub-
lications and Eurostat data. In total, the original dataset contains annual information on
immigration flows and stocks in 27 OECD countries from 95 countries of the world for the
period 1985-2006. For a more comprehensive description of earlier versions of the same
dataset, see Pedersen et al. (2008) and Pedersen and Pytlikova (2008). To construct our
data on emigration flows and stocks, the original data were purged of evident outliers and
missing data for bilateral flows and stocks for which there was suﬃcient non-missing years
were interpolated.
Intellectual Property Rights
The source is Park (2008). The data represent an index of the strength of patent pro-
tection for each of the countries of the dataset. The index is the unweighted sum of five
separate scores for: coverage; membership in international treaties; duration of protection;
enforcement mechanisms; and restrictions. Available data cover 123 countries for the pe-
riod from 1960 till 2005, in five-year intervals. Given the focus of our study, we selected
the sample of data starting in 1995. For the missing values in each of the five-year inter-
vals, we impute the index of patent protection which is defined for the starting year of the
corresponding time interval.
Additional Controls
All additional controls (GDP, population, R&D, education, government spending, trade
and FDI) are from World Bank (2009) and United Nations. All data have an annual
frequency. The education variable is measured by enrollment in tertiary education
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We have a system of 2 equations:
1 − 1−  = 0 (A)
z }| {
(− 1) 1(−1)(1)
+(1 2)[1− (1−  (−1) )]1 − 1−  = 0
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2 − 2 −  = 0 (A)
2 −
z }| {
(− 1) 1(−1)(1)
+(1 2)[1− (1−  (−1) )]
2 −  = 0
given
(1)
1  0
(1 2)
1  0
(1 2)
2  0
which implies

  0

1  0

2  0 (A)
We would like to establish whether
1
 ≷ 0
2
 ≷ 0
2
1 ≷ 0
Considering  as a function of 1, 2, and , we have the two conditions given by two
functions Γ(1 2 ) = 0, for  = 1 2:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Γ1(1 2 ) = −1(1 2 ) + 1 +  = 0
Γ2(1 2 ) = 2(1 2 ) +  − 2 = 0

Subsequently, we calculate the total diﬀerentials Γ1 and Γ2 and we equate them:
Γ1 = Γ2 ⇐⇒ Γ11 1 +
Γ1
2 2 +
Γ1
  =
Γ2
1 1 +
Γ2
2 2 +
Γ2
 
then we consider the plane (1 ) to evaluate the slope of the function 1(), so we impose
2 = 0, and after calculating the first order partial derivatives we obtain:
−
µ
(·) + 1 1
¶
1 − 1   = 2

1 1 + 2

 
Subsequently, we collect terms and identify the ratio of diﬀerentials:
1
 = −
(1 + 2)
(·) + (1 + 2)1
 (30)
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From the investigation of (30) we can deduce that:
1
  0 as (·) + (1 + 2)

1  0
We can repeat the same procedure by setting 1 = 0 in the relation Γ1 = Γ2 in order
to accomplish a relation between the diﬀerentials 2 and :
−1 2 2 − 1

  =
µ
(·) + 2 2
¶
2 + 2   − 2
The slope will amount to:
2
 = −
(1 + 2)
(·)−  + (2 + 1)2
(31)
(31) has a form which is analogous to (30), so that we can carry out a similar investigation:
2
  0 as  −  + (2 − 1)

2  0
Finally, to derive the sign of
2
1 , we divide (31) by (30) to obtain
2
1 =
2
1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
(1 + 2)
(·)−  + (2 + 1)2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
(·) + (1 − 2)1
(1 + 2)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (32)
=
(·) + (1 + 2)1
(·)−  + (2 + 1)2

Using the same argument as for (30) and (31), we can deduce from (32) that
2
1  0
because given (A), both the numerator of (32) is positive, while the denominator is negative.
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We have therefore proved that
1
  0
2
  0
2
1  0
That is, stronger IPR protection expands the size of the innovation sector from both sides
of the spectrum of skills by decreasing 1 and increasing 2. Furthermore, thresholds 1 and
2 always move in the opposite direction.
References
[1] Agrawal, A., Kapur, D. and McHale, J. (2011), “Brain drain or brain bank? the impact
of skilled emigration on poor-country innovation”, Journal of Urban Economics, 69 (1):
43-55.
[2] Aitken, B. J. and Harrison, A. E. (1999), "Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct
Foreign Investment? Evidence from Venezuela", American Economic Review, 89(3):
605-618.
[3] Barro, R. and Lee, J.W. (2010) "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the
World, 1950—2010", NBER Working Paper No. 15902.
[4] Beine, M. Docquier, F. and Ozden, C. (2011), “Diasporas,” Journal of Development
Economics, 95 (1): 30-41.
[5] Beine, M. Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H. (2001), “Brain drain and economic growth:
theory and evidence”, Journal of Development Economics, 64: 275-289.
[6] Beine, M. Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H. (2008), “Brain Drain and Human Capital
Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers”, Economic Journal 118(528):
631-652.
[7] Berry, R. and Soligo, R. (1969), “Some welfare aspects of international migration”,
Journal of Political Economy 77(5): 778-94.
[8] Bhagwati, J. and Hamada, K. (1974), “The brain drain, international integration of
markets for professionals and unemployment: A theoretical analysis”,. Journal of De-
velopment Economics: 1(1), 19-42.
30
[9] Bhagwati, J. and Rodriguez, C. (1975) “Welfare-Theoretical Analyses of the Brain
Drain”, Journal of Development Economics 2(3): 195-221.
[10] Cantwell, J. (1989), Technological Innovation and Multinational Corporations, Oxford,
UK: Basil Blackwell.
[11] Chen, Y. and Puttinan, T. (2005), “Intellectual property rights and innovation in de-
veloping countries”, Journal of Development Economics 78(2): 474-493.
[12] Coe, D. T. and Helpman, E. (1995), "International R&D spillovers", European Eco-
nomic Review, 39: 859-887.
[13] Davis, C. and Naghavi, A., "Oﬀshoring Production: A Simple Model of Wages, Pro-
ductivity, and Growth", Economic Inquiry, forthcoming.
[14] Defoort, C. (2008), "Tendances de long terme des migrations internationales: Analyse
à partir des 6 principaux pays receveurs, Population, 63 (2): 285-318.
[15] Docquier, F., and Rapoport, H. (2010), "Globalization, Brain Drain and Development",
mimeo, Université Catholique de Louvain.
[16] Domingues Dos Santos, M., and Postel-Vinay, F. (2003) "Migration as a Source of
Growth: The Perspective of a Developing Country, Journal of Population Economics,
16 (1): 161-175.
[17] Dustmann, C., Fadlon I., and Weiss Y. (2011), "Return migration, human capital
accumulation and the brain drain", Journal of Development Economics, 95 (1): 58-67.
[18] Glass A. J. and Saggi K. (1998), "International technology transfer and the technology
gap", Journal of Development Economics, 55: 369-398.
[19] Griliches, Z. (1979), "Issues in assessing the contribution of R&D to productivity
growth", Bell Journal of Economics, 10: 92-116.
[20] Griliches, Z. (1990). "Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey", Journal of
Economic Literature, 28 (4): 1661-707.
[21] Grossman, G.M. and Lai, E.L.-C. (2004), "International Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty", American Economic Review 94(5): 1635-1653.
31
[22] Gwartney, J., Lawson, R. and Samida, D. (2000), "Economic Freedom of the World:
2000 Annual Report", Vancouver, BC: The Fraser Institute.
[23] Hall, B., Jaﬀe, A. and Trajtenberg, M. (2001), “The NBER Patent citations file:
Lessons, Insights and Methodological tools”, NBER Working Paper 8498.
[24] IMF (2010), "World Economic Outlook", International Monetary Fund.
[25] Iranzo, S., and Peri, G. (2009),“Migration and trade: Theory with an application to
the Eastern—Western European Integration”, Journal of International Economics 79
(1): 1-19.
[26] Keller, W. (2004), "International Technology Diﬀusion", Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 42: 752-782.
[27] Kerr, W. R. (2008), “Ethnic scientific communities and International Technology Dif-
fusion”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 90(3): 518-537.
[28] Lorentzen J. and Mohamed, R. (2010), ". . . to each according to his (or her) needs:
Where are the Poor in Innovation Studies?", mimeo, Human Resource Research Coun-
cil, Cape Town, South Africa.
[29] Madsen, J.B., Islam, Md.R. and Ang, J.B. (2010), "Catching up to the technology
frontier: the dichotomy between innovation and imitation", Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 43(4): 1389-1411.
[30] Mancusi, M. L. (2008), “International spillovers and absorptive capacity: A cross-
country cross-sector analysis based on patents and citations”, Journal of International
Economics, 76(2): 155-165.
[31] Maskus, K. (2000), "Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy", Washington,
DC: Institute for International Economics.
[32] McAusland, C. and Kuhn, P. (2011), “Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights
and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers”, Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 95 (1): 77-87.
[33] Mayr, K. and Peri, G. (2009), "Return Migration as a Channel of Brain Gain", Berkeley
Electronic Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Contributions 9(1): Article 49.
32
[34] Meyer, J. B. (2001), "Network approach vs. brain drain: lessons from the diaspora",
International Migration Quarterly Issue, 39(5): 91-110.
[35] Meyer J. B. and Brown, M. (1999), ”Scientific Diasporas, a New Approach to the Brain
Drain”, Discussion Paper no. 41, Management of Social Transformation, UNESCO,
Paris.
[36] Miyagiwa, K. (1991) “Scale Economies in Education and the Brain Drain Problem,”
International Economic Review 32(3): 743-759.
[37] Mountford, A. (1997), "Can a brain drain be good for growth in the source economy?",
Journal of Development Economics 53 (2): 287-303.
[38] Oettl, A. and Agrawal, A. (2008), “International Labor Mobility and Knowledge Flow
Externalities” Journal of International Business Studies 39(8): 1242-1260.
[39] Parello, C. (2008), "A north—south model of intellectual property rights protection and
skill accumulation", Journal of Development Economics 85 (1-2): 253-281
[40] Park, W. G. (2008), “International patent protection: 1960—2005”, Research Policy 37:
761-766.
[41] Pedersen,J. P., Pytlikova, M. and Smith, N. (2008), "Selection and Network Eﬀects
- Migration Flows into OECD Countries 1990-2000", European Economic Review 52:
1160-1186.
[42] Pedersen, P.J. and Pytlikova, M. (2008), "EU Enlargement: Migration flows from
Central and Eastern Europe into the Nordic countries - exploiting a natural experiment,
ASB Working Paper No. 08-29.
[43] Roy, A.D. (1951), "Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings", Oxford Economics
Papers 3: 135-146.
[44] Saggi, K. (2002), "Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Technology
Transfer: A Survey", World Bank Research Observer, 17 (2): 191-235.
[45] Saint-Paul, G. (2003), "Growth Eﬀects of Nonproprietary Innovation", Journal of Eu-
ropean Economic Association 1, Nr. 2-3: 429-439.
33
[46] Saint-Paul, G. (2004), "Are Intellectual Property Rights Unfair?", Labour Economics
11: 129-144.
[47] Spilimbergo, A. (2009) "Democracy and Foreign Education", American Economic Re-
view 99 (1): 528-43.
[48] Stark, O., Helmenstein, C. and Prskawetz, A. (1997), “A Brain Gain with a Brain
Drain”, Economics Letters 55: 227-234.
[49] The Economist, "Give me your scientists...", March 7, 2009.
[50] Vandenbussche, J., Aghion, P., and Meghir, C. (2006), "Growth, distance to frontier
and composition of human capital", Journal of Economic Growth, 11 (2): 97-127.
[51] Williams, A. M. (2007), "Listen to Me, Learn with Me: International Migration and
Knowledge Transfer", British Journal of Industrial Relations, 45(2): 361-382.
[52] WIPO (2010), "World Intellectual Property Indicators" Report, World Intellectual
Property Organization, Geneva.
[53] World Bank (2009), "World Development Indicators (WDI)" Report, Washington DC.
34
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure	1.	
Stronger	IPRs	Enforcement	
	
z1
IPR protection (wH )
IPR protection (z1 so  z     ) ‐
production innovation
skills
wages
z1’
 
 
	
	
	
Figure	2.	
Diaspora	Gains	
	
 
             
no migration
emigrants
Diaspora(zi )
Migration (z2 so   z     )‐
knowledge
production innovation
skills
wages
z1 z2
 
Figure	3.	
The	Impact	of	IPRs	on	Diaspora	
	
      
Diaspora(zi formore workers)
production
skills
wages
z1
innovation
z2z1’ z2’
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	4.	
The	Joint	Impact	of	Migration	and	IPRs	on	Innovation	
 
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f E
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
on
 P
at
en
ts
0 1 2 3 4 5
IPR Protection Index
 Marginal Effect
 95% Confidence Interval
 
Table	1.		
Summary	Statistics	
	
	 Observations	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min.	 Max.	
Resident	Patent	Applications	 351	 2831.638	 10528.06	 2	 122318	
Resident	Patent	Grants	 325	 1351.92	 4179.25	 1	 25644	
Emigration	Flow	 420	 53451.54	 60715.85	 293	 351567	
Emigration	Stock	 420	 918893.4	 1564047	 3979	 11600000	
Emigration	Flow	Index	 420	 0.616	 0.080	 0.375	 0.798	
Emigration	Stock	Index	 420	 0.636	 0.074	 0.327	 0.800	
IPRs	Protection	 420	 2.940	 0.843	 1.080	 4.540	
Population	 420	 17.397	 1.357	 14.724	 20.994	
GDP	Per	Capita	 420	 8.492	 0.755	 6.635	 9.779	
Resident	Patent	Stock	(Applications)	 363	 12203.93	 34456.52	 4.709	 266384.1	
Resident	Stock	(Grants)	 352	 5728.098	 17076.18	 3.442	 108220.1	
R&D	 248	 0.502	 0.318	 0.035	 1.417	
Tertiary	Education	 330	 0.260	 0.179	 0.020	 0.760	
Government	Spending	 415	 0.756	 0.165	 0.029	 0.993	
Trade	 411	 0.715	 0.395	 0.149	 2.204	
FDI	 419	 0.030	 0.029	 0	 0.237	
 
 
Table	2.		
The	Impact	of	Emigration	and	IPRs	Protection	on	Resident	Patent	Applications	
 
	 Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Emigration	Flowt‐5	 ‐0.421**	 ‐0.489**	 ‐0.924*** ‐0.400*	 ‐0.599**	 ‐0.398**	 ‐0.421**	 ‐0.538**	
	 (0.198)	 (0.185)	 (0.212)	 (0.207)	 (0.254)	 (0.194)	 (0.201)	 (0.244)	
IPRs	Protectiont‐1	 ‐1.330**	 ‐1.391**	 ‐2.057*** ‐1.323**	 ‐1.775**	 ‐1.338**	 ‐1.331**	 ‐1.581*	
	 (0.603)	 (0.620)	 (0.670)	 (0.639)	 (0.731)	 (0.601)	 (0.618)	 (0.785)	
Emigr.	Flowt‐5	x	IPRst‐1	 0.123**	 0.135**	 0.207*** 0.126**	 0.169**	 0.125**	 0.123**	 0.155**	
	 (0.056)	 (0.053)	 (0.062)	 (0.058)	 (0.071)	 (0.056)	 (0.057)	 (0.067)	
Population	 4.873***	 2.589**	 4.077**	 5.381*** 4.834*** 5.480***	 4.878*** 1.504	
	 (1.421)	 (1.170)	 (1.687)	 (1.222)	 (1.458)	 (1.370)	 (1.486)	 (1.267)	
GDP	Per	Capitat‐1	 1.661**	 1.279**	 0.626	 2.175*** 1.550**	 1.824**	 1.663**	 0.432	
	 (0.739)	 (0.494)	 (0.721)	 (0.698)	 (0.741)	 (0.701)	 (0.741)	 (0.583)	
Patent	Stock	(Appl.)	t‐1	 	 0.621***	 	 	 	 	 	 0.877***
	 	 (0.145)	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.245)	
R&Dt‐1	 	 	 1.212*** 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.374)	 	 	 	 	 	
Tertiary	Education	 	 	 	 ‐0.506	 	 	 	 0.317	
	 	 	 	 (0.875)	 	 	 	 (0.742)	
Government	Spendingt‐1	 	 	 	 	 ‐0.516	 	 	 ‐0.388	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.330)	 	 	 (0.379)	
Tradet‐1	 	 	 	 	 	 0.627	 	 0.474	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.390)	 	 (0.402)	
FDIt‐1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.030	 ‐2.259	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.830)	 (1.434)	
Constant	 ‐89.65***	 ‐50.60**	 ‐62.47*	 ‐102.8***	 ‐85.64***	 ‐101.9***	 ‐89.76***	 ‐25.53	
	 (28.75)	 (22.30)	 (35.49)	 (23.29)	 (29.28)	 (27.08)	 (29.78)	 (24.98)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Country	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Time	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Number	of	Countries	 35	 32	 32	 35	 35	 35	 35	 31	
Observations	 348	 321	 200	 280	 316	 343	 348	 224	
R‐Squared	 0.354	 0.484	 0.534	 0.378	 0.365	 0.382	 0.354	 0.560	
Note:	Robust	t	statistics	in	parentheses,	clustered	at	country	level.	*	significant	at	10%;	**	significant	at	5%;	***	significant	at	1%.	Patents,	emigration,	population	and	
GDP	per	capita	are	in	logarithms.	The	dependent	variable	is	resident	patent	applications.	The	dependent	variable	is	resident	patent	applications.	Patents,	emigration	
flow	and	stock,	population	and	GDP	per	capita	are	in	logarithms.			
Table	3.		
The	Impact	of	Emigration	and	IPRs	Protection	on	Resident	Patent	Applications	
Robustness	Checks	
 
First	
Differences	
First	
Differences	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Emigration	Flowt‐5	 ‐0.257	 ‐0.289	 	 	
	 (0.156)	 (0.188)	 	 	
IPRs	Protectiont‐1	 ‐0.947*	 ‐0.969*	 ‐1.817*** ‐2.166***	
	 (0.502)	 (0.563)	 (0.551)	 (0.530)	
Emigr.	Flowt‐5	x	IPRst‐1	 0.083*	 0.089*	 	 	
	 (0.044)	 (0.052)	 	 	
Emigration	Stockt‐5	 	 	 ‐0.539*** ‐0.636***	
	 	 	 (0.168)	 (0.162)	
Emigr.	Stockt‐5	x	IPRst‐1	 	 	 0.139*** 0.167***	
	 	 	 (0.039)	 (0.036)	
Population	 1.136	 1.207	 2.183*	 0.896	
	 (1.206)	 (1.247)	 (1.275)	 (1.286)	
GDP	Per	Capitat‐1	 0.795	 0.484	 1.268**	 0.378	
	 (0.479)	 (0.636)	 (0.509)	 (0.596)	
Patent	Stock	(Appl.)	t‐1	 0.461*** 0.607**	 0.612*** 0.912***	
	 (0.154)	 (0.233)	 (0.134)	 (0.233)	
Tertiary	Education	 	 ‐0.459	 	 0.160	
	 	 (0.596)	 	 (0.726)	
Government	Spendingt‐1	 	 0.107	 	 ‐0.313	
	 	 (0.287)	 	 (0.364)	
Tradet‐1	 	 0.736*	 	 0.651	
	 	 (0.410)	 	 (0.421)	
FDIt‐1	 	 ‐1.925	 	 ‐2.209	
	 	 (1.341)	 	 (1.313)	
Constant	 	 	 ‐41.25	 ‐11.96	
	 	 	 (24.76)	 (26.25)	
	 	 	 	 	
Country	Effects	 	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Time	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Number	of	Countries	 32	 30	 32	 31	
Observations	 270	 166	 321	 224	
R‐Squared	 0.087	 0.148	 0.491	 0.579	
Note:	Robust	t	statistics	in	parentheses,	clustered	at	country	level.	*	significant	at	10%;	**	significant	at	
5%;	 ***	 significant	 at	 1%.	 Patents,	 emigration,	 population	 and	 GDP	 per	 capita	 are	 in	 logarithms.	 The	
dependent	 variable	 is	 resident	patent	 applications.	 Patents,	 emigration	 flow	and	 stock,	population	and	
GDP	per	capita	are	in	logarithms.	
Table 4.  
The Impact of Emigration and IPRs Protection on Resident Patent Grants	
	
	 Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Emigration	Flowt‐5	 ‐0.510*** ‐0.979*** 	 	
	 (0.177)	 (0.333)	 	 	
IPRs	Protectiont‐1	 ‐1.585**	 ‐2.987*** ‐2.076*** ‐3.376***	
	 (0.622)	 (0.943)	 (0.637)	 (0.881)	
Emigr.	Flowt‐5	x	IPRst‐1	 0.137**	 0.272*** 	 	
	 (0.051)	 (0.093)	 	 	
Emigration	Stockt‐5	 	 	 ‐0.639*** ‐0.911***	
	 	 	 (0.181)	 (0.264)	
Emigr.	Stockt‐5	x	IPRst‐1	 	 	 0.146*** 0.250***	
	 	 	 (0.042)	 (0.068)	
Population	 4.928*** 5.390*** 4.195**	 4.800***	
	 (1.682)	 (1.898)	 (1.547)	 (1.482)	
GDP	Per	Capitat‐1	 2.103*** 1.826*	 2.005*** 1.941**	
	 (0.693)	 (0.943)	 (0.646)	 (0.811)	
Patent	Stock	(Grant.)t‐1	 0.659*** 0.475*	 0.702*** 0.489*	
	 (0.196)	 (0.241)	 (0.195)	 (0.243)	
Tertiary	Education	 	 0.588	 	 0.278	
	 	 (1.786)	 	 (1.722)	
Government	Spendingt‐1	 	 ‐0.963	 	 ‐0.889	
	 	 (0.855)	 	 (0.902)	
Tradet‐1	 	 0.981	 	 1.081	
	 	 (0.887)	 	 (0.859)	
FDIt‐1	 	 ‐3.322	 	 ‐3.096	
	 	 (2.114)	 	 (1.979)	
Constant	 ‐99.04***	 ‐98.49***	 ‐82.42**	 ‐87.57***	
	 (32.19)	 (32.59)	 (30.37)	 (26.52)	
	 	 	 	 	
Country	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Time	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Number	of	Countries	 32	 30	 32	 30 
Observations	 297	 210	 297	 210	
R‐Squared	 0.288	 0.323	 0.297	 0.333	
Note:	Robust	t	statistics	in	parentheses,	clustered	at	country	level.	*	significant	at	10%;	**	significant	at	5%;	
***	significant	at	1%.	Patents,	emigration,	population	and	GDP	per	capita	are	in	logarithms.	The	dependent	
variable	is	resident	patent	grants.	Patents,	emigration	flow	and	stock,	population	and	GDP	per	capita	are	in	
logarithms.	
Table	5.		
The	Emigration	Index,	IPRs	Protection	and	Resident	Patent	Grants	
	
	 Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
Fixed	
Effects	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Emigration	Flow	Indext‐5	 ‐0.146**	 ‐0.151	 	 	
	 (0.065)	 (0.104)	 	 	
IPRs	Protectiont‐1	 ‐0.043**	 ‐0.044**	 ‐0.039**	 ‐0.060**	
	 (0.018)	 (0.021)	 (0.018)	 (0.028)	
Emigr.	Flow	Ind.t‐5	x	IPRst‐1	 0.055**	 0.054**	 	 	
	 (0.025)	 (0.026)	 	 	
Emigration	Stock	Indext‐5	 	 	 ‐0.120	 ‐0.175	
	 	 	 (0.102)	 (0.122)	
Emigr.	Stock	Ind.t‐5	x	IPRst‐1	 	 	 0.049*	 0.077**	
	 	 	 (0.024)	 (0.035)	
GDP	Per	Capitat‐1	 0.005	 ‐0.002	 ‐0.000	 ‐0.005	
	 (0.017)	 (0.019)	 (0.017)	 (0.019)	
Patent	Stock	(Grant.)t‐1	 ‐0.013	 ‐0.010	 ‐0.016	 ‐0.021	
	 (0.023)	 (0.012)	 (0.028)	 (0.015)	
Tertiary	Education	 	 ‐0.017	 	 ‐0.030	
	 	 (0.016)	 	 (0.019)	
Government	Spendingt‐1	 	 ‐0.056*	 	 ‐0.052*	
	 	 (0.032)	 	 (0.029)	
Tradet‐1	 	 0.052	 	 0.055	
	 	 (0.038)	 	 (0.040)	
FDIt‐1	 	 ‐0.085**	 	 ‐0.043	
	 	 (0.033)	 	 (0.036)	
Constant	 0.091	 0.164	 0.121	 0.206	
	 (0.137)	 (0.204)	 (0.140)	 (0.208)	
	 	 	 	 	
Country	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Time	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Number	of	Countries	 32	 30	 32	 30	
Observations	 297	 210	 297	 210	
R‐Squared	 0.0787	 0.188	 0.0704	 0.207	
Note:	Robust	t	statistics	in	parentheses,	clustered	at	country	level.	*	significant	at	10%;	**	significant	at	5%;	
***	significant	at	1%.	Patents,	emigration,	population	and	GDP	per	capita	are	in	logarithms.	The	dependent	
variable	is	resident	patent	grants	rate	(resident	patent	grants	per	thousand	of	population).	The	emigration	
index	is	calculated	as	described	in	the	text.	Population	and	GDP	per	capita	are	in	logarithms.	
 
 
 
 
 
